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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Luis James Pierce appeals from the district court's order revoking his 
probation. Notwithstanding the fact that his appeal is from an order revoking 
probation, Pierce also requests his underlying conviction be vacated. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedinas 
Pierce was arrested after having sexual contact with a four-year old girl he 
was babysitting. The pre-sentence investigation report ("PSI") sets forth the facts 
leading to Pierce's arrest: 
(9114106 PSI, p.2.) 
The state filed a complaint charging Pierce with sexual abuse of a child 
under the age of sixteen years. (Augmented Record: 3/7/06 Complaint.) In that 
complaint, the state neglected to assert that Pierce was over the age of eighteen. 
Pierce was arraigned on this charge and a preliminary hearing was set. 
(Augmented Record: 3/7/06 Ada County Magistrate Minutes.) However, on the 
date set for the preliminary hearing, the state filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint which was granted. (Augmented Record: 3120106 Ada County 
Magistrate Minutes; 3120106 Order of Release.) The state filed a new complaint 
the following day alleging the same crime but specifying that Pierce was over the 
age of eighteen when the crime occurred. (R., pp.7-8). Pierce was bound over 
to the district court following a preliminary hearing. (R., pp.13-21.) 
Pierce pled guilty and was sentenced to a unified term of fifteen years, 
with five years fixed. (R., pp.41, 51-54.) The district court retained jurisdiction, 
however, and placed Pierce in the retained jurisdiction program. (R., pp.52-53.) 
Pierce completed the program and was placed on probation for a period of 
fourteen years. (R., pp.58-71.) Seven months into Pierce's probation, the state 
filed a motion for probation violation. (R., pp.78-81.) Pierce admitted to violating 
his probation by frequenting places where minors or victims of choice 
congregate, by failing to complete sex offender treatment, and by failing to pay 
his supervision fees. (12/13/07 Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.1 I ,  L.20.) 
The district court revoked Pierce's probation and ordered his underlying 
sentence executed. (R., pp.89-91.) Pierce filed a timely Notice of Appeal from 
the Order of Revocation of Probation, Imposition of Sentence and Commitment. 
(R., pp.92-94.) 
ISSUES 
Pierce states the issues on appeal as: 
1 Has Mr. Pierce's right to be free from trial by Information 
after a grand jury has ignored a charge, protected by Article I 
§ 8 of the Idaho Constitution, been violated requiring that his 
conviction be vacated as the district court did not have 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the alleged crime? 
2 Did the district court abuse its discretion after Mr. Pierce 
admitted to violating his probation by executing his original 
sentence under the facts and circumstances of this case? 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Pierce failed to show he is entitled to vacate his underlying 
conviction in an appeal from an order revoking probation where he entered a 
valid guilty plea waiving any defect in the probable cause determination? 
2. Has Pierce failed to meet his burden of showing his constitutional 
rights were violated as a result of the grand jury allegedly ignoring the charge 
against him where there is no evidence in the record to support such a claim? 
3. Has Pierce failed to carry his burden of establishing the district 
court clearly abused its discretion when it ordered executed the originally 
imposed sentence upon revocation of Pierce's probation? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Pierce Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishinq A Jurisdictional Claim And 
Therefore Waived His Claim Of Error When He Entered His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Pierce seeks to vacate his conviction by claiming the trial court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over his case due to an alleged violation of Article I, § 
8 of the ldaho Constitution. Pierce's claim fails because Article I, § 8 is not a 
jurisdictional provision and, therefore, any claimed defect was waived when 
Pierce pled guilty. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review. State v. Kavaiecz, 139 
ldaho 482,483,80 P.3d 1083,1084 (2003). 
C. Article I. 5 8 Is Not A Jurisdictional Provision And, Even If It Could Be 
Construed As Such, It Would Relate To A Court's Personal Jurisdiction 
Not Subiect Matter Jurisdiction 
Pierce claims the district court lacked jurisdiction in his underlying criminal 
action because he claims the prosecutor violated Article I, 9 8 of the ldaho 
Constitution. That constitutional provision provides: 
Prosecutions only by indictment or information. -- No person 
shall be held to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any 
grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on 
information of the public prosecutor, after a commitment by a 
magistrate, except in cases of impeachment, in cases cognizable 
by probate courts or by justices of the peace, and in cases arising 
in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; 
provided, that a grand jury may be summoned upon the order of the 
district court in the manner provided by law, and provided further, 
that after a charge has been ignored by a grand jury, no person 
shall be held to answer, or for trial therefore, upon information of 
the public prosecutor. 
According to Pierce, an information filed in violation of Article I, § 8, i&., an 
information filed after the charge is submitted and ignored by a grand jury, is a 
"nullity" and fails to confer subject matter jurisdiction. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13- 
16.) As set forth below, this claim is without merit. Pierce acknowledges the 
absence of any authority to support his claim', but argues such a conclusion is 
compelled by "the plain reading of the constitutional provision" and the dissenting 
opinion in State v. Wilson, 41 ldaho 598, 242 P. 787 (1925). (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.14-16.) Even assuming arguendo that the information in this case was filed in 
violation of Article I, ij 8, Pierce's claim that the information was a nullity and 
failed to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court fails. 
The courts of ldaho are vested with the subject matter jurisdiction 
conferred upon them by the ldaho Constitution and the statutes of this state. 
Pursuant to Article V, § 20 of the ldaho Constitution and I.C. §§ 1-705 and 18- 
202, the district courts of ldaho are vested with original subject matter jurisdiction 
over all crimes committed within this state. See also State v. Doyle, 121 ldaho 
91 1, 828 P.2d 1316 (1992) (an ldaho court will have subject matter jurisdiction 
over a crime if any essential element of the crime, including the result, occurs 
' The only authority Pierce cites is the dissenting opinion in State v. Wilson, 41 
ldaho 616, 242 P. 787 (1925). The state acknowledges that in Wilson a 
dissenting justice asserted that a violation of Article I, 9 8 deprived the court of 
jurisdiction and that as a result the "verdict of guilty and the judgment of 
conviction thereon are void." 41 ldaho at 616. 242 P. at 792. Although, the 
majority never addressed the issue directly, the majority obviously rejected this 
argument because it affirmed Wilson's conviction. d. at 607. 
within ldaho). It is well established that it is the charging document that confers 
subject matter jurisdiction on a district court. State v. Ro~ers, 140 ldaho 223, 
228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1133 (2004) ("The information, indictment, or complaint 
alleging an offense was committed within the state of ldaho confers subject 
matter jurisdiction upon the court.") (citing State v. Slater, 71 ldaho 335, 338, 231 
P.2d 424, 425 (1951)). The jurisdictional question presented by any charging 
document is whether it alleges that a criminal offense was committed within the 
state of ldaho. State v. Jones, 140 ldaho 755, 757-58, 101 P.3d 699, 701-02 
(2004). The ldaho Court of Appeals has clearly explained what constitutes a 
jurisdictional defect and what deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction: "A 
jurisdictional defect exists in an indictment or information: 1) when the alleged 
facts are not made criminal by statute; 2) there is a failure to state facts essential 
to establish the offense charged; 3) the alleged facts show on their face that the 
court has no jurisdiction of the charged offense; or 4) the allegations fail to show 
that the offense charged was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court." State v. Izzard, 136 ldaho 124, 127, 29 P.2d 960, 963 (Ct. App. 2001). 
None of the above mentioned defects exist in this case. The information 
Pierce pled guilty to alleged facts sufficient to charge an offense made criminal 
by statute and that the crime was committed in the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court. (R., pp.20-21.) Accordingly, Pierce has failed to meet his burden of 
showing that the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction. 
Pierce nevertheless argues that, regardless of the information's facial 
validity, the indictment process was jurisdictionally defective in light of Article I, § 
8. As a result, he claims he can challenge his conviction at anytime. Pierce is 
mistaken. Article I, § 8 is not a jurisdictional provision but a constitutionally 
provided affirmative defense. 
A plain reading of the text of Article I, 3 8 makes clear that if a prosecutor 
elects to proceed to a probable cause determination via grand jury and the 
grand jury ignores the charge, LC, returns a no bill, the prosecutor is precluded 
from filing the same charge by way of information. Article I, § 8 is a procedural 
framework that governs how the state may charge an individual with a crime. In 
this sense it is like another ldaho constitutional provision, the double jeopardy 
clause, and operates as an affirmative defense to prosecution under certain 
circumstances. ldaho Constitution Article I, § 13 ("No person shall be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense."); see also U.S. Const. amend. V. "An 
affirmative defense is an argument or assertion of fact that, if true, will defeat the 
plaintiffs claim even if all allegations in the complaint are true." Douulas 
Disposal, Inc, v. Wee Haul, LLC, 170 P.3d 508, 513 (Nev. 2007). However, 
affirmative defenses such as double jeopardy are not jurisdictional and may be 
waived. See State v. Maaill, 119 ldaho 218, 219-20, 804 P.2d 947, 948-49 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (defendant's guilty plea was not conditional and waived issues of 
venue and double jeopardy). There is no basis for distinguishing between the 
affirmative defense provided by Article I, § 8 and the double jeopardy provision 
found in Article I, § 13. Neither provision says anything about jurisdiction, yet 
both provide bars to subsequent prosecution. 
Because Article I, 3 8 is an affirmative defense and not jurisdictional it can 
be waived by the entry of a valid plea. "Ordinarily, a valid plea of guilty waives all 
non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional or statutory, in 
prior proceedings." State v. Kelchner, 130 ldaho 37, 39, 936 P.2d 680, 682 
(1997); State v. Book, 127 ldaho 352, 354, 900 P.2d 1363, 1365 (1995); State v. 
Salinas, 134 ldaho 362, 367, 2 P.3d 747, 752 (Ct. App. 2000) (guilty plea waives 
all non-jurisdictional challenges to conviction for purposes of direct appeal). 
Here, Pierce pled guilty to sexual abuse of a minor. (08/01106 Tr., p.1, L. l  - p.16, 
L.21.) Consequently, Pierce waived his right to make a challenge under Article I, 
Pierce's claim also fails even if it is viewed not as an affirmative defense 
but as a general challenge to the probable cause determination. Because 
defects in the probable cause determination process do not deprive courts of 
subject matter jurisdiction, ldaho courts require challenges to those defects be 
made in a timely manner. State v. Fowler, 105 ldaho 642, 671 P.2d 1106 (Ct. 
App. 1983), illustrates this principle. 
In Fowler the defendant asked the court to overturn his conviction 
because of a defect in the preliminary hearing process. 105 ldaho at 643, 671 
P.2d at 1106. The court of appeals concluded Fowler waived his right to 
challenge the probable cause determination once he pled guilty: 
[W]e hold that Fowler's plea of guilty to that new charge waived his 
right to contest the preliminary hearing procedure. The purpose of a 
preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause 
to require the accused to stand trial. It is well settled that a valid 
plea of guilty, voluntarily and understandingly given, waives all non- 
jurisdictional defects and defenses, whether constitutional or 
statutory, in prior proceedings. Here Fowler does not attack the 
entry and acceptance of his plea. His plea of guilty to the restaurant 
burglary therefore constituted a waiver of the procedure to 
determine probable cause, just as if he had waived the preliminary 
hearing itself, on that charge. 
Id. (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). Here, just like in Fowler, the -
claimed defect is in the process and procedure to determine probable cause. 
Thus, here, just as in Fowler, Pierce waived any claimed defect in that process 
by entering his guilty plea. 
In sum, Article I, 3 8 is not jurisdictional but a constitutionally provided 
affirmative defense akin to double jeopardy. As such, the defense was waived 
when Pierce pled guilty. To the extent Pierce's claim is construed as a challenge 
to the probable cause determination, any such claim was also waived as a result 
of Pierce's guilty plea. 
II. 
Pierce Has Failed To Show From The Record That The Grand Jurv Heard And 
Lqnored The Charqe Aqainst Him Or. In The Alternative, That His Claim Was Not 
Waived When He Entered His Guiltv Plea 
A. Introduction 
Pierce claims "a grand jury heard his case and ignored the charge against 
him despite the fact that there is no official document in the record indicating as 
such." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Pierce's claim is without merit. There is no 
evidence that the "grand jury heard his case and ignored the charge against 
him." (Appellant's Brief, p.22.) 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record to 
substantiate his claim of error. In the absence of an adequate record, error will 
not be presumed; rather, missing portions of the record must be presumed to 
support the action of the trial court. Retamoza v. State, 125 ldaho 792, 795, 874 
P.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. The Record Does Not Establish That The Grand Jury Heard A Charge 
Against Pierce Or That The Grand Jurv Ignored That Charge Prior To An 
Information Beins Filed Against Him 
Pierce claims a grand jury ignored the child abuse charge against him 
prior to the filing of the information. (Appellant's Brief, p.29.) Pierce, however, 
has failed to support this claim with evidence from the record and, therefore, has 
failed to meet his burden of establishing a valid claim. As set forth above, Article 
I, 3 8 of the ldaho Constitution states "that after a charge has been ignored by a 
grand jury, no person shall be held to answer, or for trial therefore, upon 
information of the public prosecutor." Pierce concedes "[nlo document exists in 
the record unquestionably showing that a grand jury heard and ignored the 
charge against Mr. Pierce." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Nevertheless, he claims he 
has met his burden because of a single off-hand and unrelated statement made 
by a prosecutor who was not the primary prosecutor handling the case. That 
statement, in context, made at Pierce's sentencing hearing, was as follows: 
THE COURT: And has the State received these materials, 
Ms. Fisher, and had adequate time to review them? 
MS. FISHER: I have, Your Honor. And what was not 
included in those that I saw in Ms. Armstrong's file are two 
photographs of the children in question. I would like to include 
those for purposes of the pre-sentence investigation. These were 
shown to the grand jury as well. 
(1 0/25/06 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 14-23.) Pierce claims this single and isolated statement 
is sufficient proof that the grand jury both heard and ignored the charge against 
him. Pierce is mistaken. In no way does this isolated statement satisfy Pierce's 
burden of proving that a grand jury heard and ignored the charge against him. 
There is nothing in the record that supports Pierce's claim that the 
prosecutor's statement was an "admission" that a grand jury reviewed this case. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.) Indeed, the record reveals evidence of the contrary -- 
that the prosecuting attorney was confused or simply made a mistake. As 
admitted by Pierce, there is no documentation that supports the claim that the 
grand jury heard and ignored Pierce's case. Not only is there no documentation 
or record of a grand jury reviewing the case, but the documentation that does 
exist shows that this case proceeded by complaint, which was filed the day after 
law enforcement interviewed Pierce regarding the allegations. (Compare 9/14/06 
PSI, p.2 (indicating interview with law enforcement on 3/6/06) with original 
complaint (Augmented Record: 3/7/06 Complaint)). Pierce was arraigned that 
same day and a preliminary hearing was set for March 20, 2006. The case was 
dismissed on the date of the preliminary hearing and a new complaint was filed 
the following day. (Augmented Record: 3120106 Ada County Magistrate Minutes, 
Order of Release dated 3120106.) Pierce's assumption that the state was 
simultaneously attempting to proceed against him via grand jury indictment has 
no support in the record 
Pierce also relies on a letter from the Ada County Court Clerk, J. David 
Navarro made in response to the Supreme Court's order to conduct a search of 
grand jury proceedings involving Pierce. (12/12/08 Response of the District 
Court Clerk to Order Re: Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule Pending Grand Jury Determination (emphasis added)). Pierce argues 
this Court should determine that this letter is factual support for his claim that a 
grand jury heard and ignored the charge against him. As a threshold matter, 
however, Pierce's reliance is misplaced. It is inappropriate to request an 
appellate court to make a factual determination on evidence not before the 
district court. See Weekly v. City of Mesa, 888 P.2d 1346, 1353 (Ariz. App. 
1994) ("We will not presume to make such factual determinations for the first time 
on appeal."). 
Even if this Court considers the letter, the letter does not support Pierce's 
claim that it is evidence that a grand jury heard and ignored the charge against 
him. The clerk responded to the Supreme Court's order to conduct a search of 
grand jury proceedings involving Pierce as follows: 
The staff of the clerk's office was unable to locate any 
records regarding grand jury proceedings involving the Defendant- 
Appellant nor any information that such proceedings took place. 
The staffs search indicated that records of three grand jury 
proceedings (Nos. 22, 23 and 24), which may have taken place 
during the approximate time frame, were not received by the clerk's 
office. The clerk's staff was unable to find any grand jury minutes, 
voting records, or other documents showing that a grand jury 
declined to issue an indictment against the Defendant-Appellant. 
(12/12/08 Response of the District Court Clerk to Order Re: Motion to Augment 
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule Pending Grand Jury Determination 
(emphasis added)). Despite making clear that there were no records regarding 
grand jury proceedings involving Pierce, Pierce nonetheless argues that the 
response supports his claim. Specifically, he argues the letter shows there were 
actual grand proceedings on those days and the fact that there is no evidence of 
the grand jury ignoring the charge against him means little because the 
proceedings are secret and because there is "no criminal rule that specifically 
states what a grand jury is to do when they 'ignore' a charge." (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.19-21.) Pierce fails to appreciate, however, the clerk's response that although 
there "may have been" grand jury proceedings on the days in question, there 
were simply no records involving Pierce -- "no grand jury minutes, voting records, 
or other documents showing that a grand jury declined to issue an indictment 
against" Pierce. (12/12/08 Response of the District Court Clerk to Order Re: 
Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule Pending Grand Jury 
Determination). Again, evidence that contradicts Pierce's claim that a grand jury 
ignored the claim against him. 
111 .  
Pierce Has Failed To Establish The District Court Clearly Abused Its Discretion 
When It Ordered Executed The Previously Imposed Sentence Upon Revokinq 
Pierce's Probation 
A. Introduction 
Pierce also contends the district court abused its discretion when, upon 
revoking Pierce's probation, it ordered executed the previously imposed, but 
suspended, fifteen-year sentence with five years fixed. (Appellant's Brief, p.23.) 
Specifically, Pierce claims his sentence is excessive "considering the nature of 
his criminal act and his actions since that time." (Appellant's Brief, pp.23.) 
Pierce has failed to show an abuse of discretion because Pierce has failed to 
establish how the sentence has been rendered unreasonable since imposition of 
his sentence. 
B. Standard Of Review 
To prevail on appeal, Pierce must establish that the district court clearly 
abused its discretion in ordering executed the previously imposed sentence. See 
State v. Grove, 109 ldaho 372, 707 P.2d 483 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Tucker, 
103 ldaho 885, 655 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1982). The court may, after a probation 
violation has been proven, order the suspended sentence to be executed or, in 
the alternative, the court is authorized under I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. 
State v. Marks, 116 ldaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). On 
review, the appellate court must determine whether the district court acted within 
the boundaries of its discretion, consistent with any legal standards applicable to 
its specific choices, and whether the district court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. State v. Beckett, 122 ldaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327(Ct. 
App. 1992). 
However, if the original sentence was not appealed, an appellate court will 
not review that original sentence for excessiveness upon the facts then existing. 
m, 109 ldaho at 373, 707 P.2d at 484; Tucker, 103 ldaho at 887-88, 655 
P.2d at 94-95. Rather, the focus is upon all circumstances bearing on the 
decision to order the previously imposed sentence into execution, including 
events occurring between the original pronouncement of sentence and the 
revocation of probation. m, 109 ldaho at 373,707 P.2d at 484. 
C. Pierce Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Clearly Abused Its 
Discretion When It Ordered Executed The Oriainallv Imposed Sentence 
Upon Revocation Of Probation 
Pierce first argues the district court abused its discretion by ordering 
executed the original sentence because "of the nature of the offense and the 
character of the offender." (Appellant's Brief, p.28.) Because Pierce did not 
directly appeal the original sentence for child abuse he "may not now challenge 
the reasonableness of the sentence originally imposed." State v. Coffin, 122 
ldaho 392, 394, 834 P.2d 909, 911 (Ct. App. 1992). Rather, the focus is 
"restricted to a determination of whether [Pierce's] sentence now appears 
excessive in light of circumsta'nces existing when the court ordered the sentence 
to beexecuted upon revocation of probation." Jcj. Pierce has failed to meet his 
burden. 
While Pierce goes to great lengths to describe the unreasonableness of 
his underlying sentence in reference to circumstances at that time, see, e.g., "it 
should be recognized that the nature of Mr. Pierce's offense, while certainly 
criminal and deserving of punishment, was not severe" (Appellant's Brief, p.24), 
"in exchange for nothing, Mr. Pierce agreed to plead guilty" (Appellant's Brief, 
p.25), "Mr. Pierce was 23 years old at the time of his original sentencing" 
(Appellant's Brief, p.25) and "Mr. Pierce's biggest problem is his alcoholism" 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.25-26), there is very little regarding his actions between the 
original pronouncement of sentence and the revocation of probation. Indeed, the 
only argument Pierce makes is that during this time period he admitted to 
violating his probation and did not re-offend by committing an additional sex 
crime or another criminal act. Such claims, even if true, do not render a 
reasonably imposed sentence unreasonable. 
In contrast, the probation officers that filed the report of probation violation 
concluded that from the time of his release on probation "Pierce has worked hard 
at flying under the radar of Bethal Ministries and Probation & Parole" and that "he 
is more motivated toward associating with prohibited persons and minors than he 
is in addressing the thoughts and behaviors that led to his conviction." (Report of 
Probation Violation, p.5 (attached to 1/25/08 PSI).) The officer concluded Pierce 
"sees nothing wrong with having physical contact with minors, despite his instant 
offense and probation conditions prohibiting such contacts." The probation 
officer reached these conclusions because Pierce failed to participate in any sex 
offender treatment as required, ignored conditions of his probation by going to 
places where children congregate, and by failing to pay certain fees. Id. 
In light of these statements, the record clearly demonstrates probation 
was not effective. Pierce refused to attend the treatment he was under court 
order to complete. Pierce committed a sexual crime against a child and his 
treatment is necessary to ensure the protection of society. Furthermore, as his 
actions have indicated, he is unwilling to do what the court asks of him. 
Considering all the facts of this case, Pierce has failed to establish the district 
court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering his sentence 
executed without reduction. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests Pierce's conviction, probation revocation, 
and sentence be affirmed. 
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